We study how deregulation of corporate law affects the decision of entrepreneurs of where to incorporate. Recent rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have enabled entrepreneurs to select their country of incorporation independently of their real seat. We analyze foreign incorporations in the U.K., where incorporations of limited liability companies can be arranged at low cost. Using data for over 2 million companies from around the world incorporating in the U.K., we find a large increase in cross-country incorporations from E.U. Member States following the ECJ rulings. In line with regulatory cost theories, incorporations are primarily driven by minimum capital requirements and setup costs in home countries. We record widespread use of special incorporation agents to facilitate legal mobility across countries.
Introduction
Historically, companies have tended to incorporate in the country in which they operate. This association of legal with real seats is mostly due to limitations on the ability of companies to incorporate in countries that differ from the main location of their operations. Legal and real seat have been allowed to differ across states within the U.S. but to date there has been no evidence on mobility across countries.
The contribution of this paper is to analyze incorporations in the U.K., originating from around the world using data for over 2 million companies newly incorporated in the U. K. between 1997 and 2006 . We use these data to evaluate the impact of liberalization of country of incorporation prompted by a series of landmark rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) permitting free choice of location within the European Union (E.U.)
2 Although the ECJ decisions have caused considerable legal debate, there is no consensus about their practical consequences. 3 While some authors predicted that companies would move their legal seat to the U.K., others argued that there would be no measurable impact as entrepreneurs would prefer to stay with their familiar domestic legal systems. This paper is the first to quantify the impact of legal deregulation on incorporation decisions.
We then investigate what determines the choice of corporate law. A regulatory cost theory would suggest that given comparable quality of company law, consumers would opt for low-cost systems. If commercial law is easily substitutable across countries then price considerations should dominate. Finally, we provide evidence of whether the ECJ rulings are leading to regulatory competition between E.U. Member States to provide low-cost corporate law.
The choice of the U.K. as the country of study follows from the fact that it has the simplest incorporation procedures and the lowest costs of incorporation in the E.U. It also has a large number of incorporations from outside the E.U. and a central company register from which information on the nature of incorporations can be derived. Additionally, the export of corporate law to other countries has always been possible from the U.K. and is an important feature of our analysis.
The existing literature evaluates the effect of choice of state of incorporation in the U.S. on firm value (Daines (2001) , Subramanian (2004) ) and the effect of regulatory competition between states (Romano (1985) , Kahan and Kamar (2002) ). This paper is most closely related to Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) who use data on the costs of entry of firms in different countries to establish the adverse effect of regulation on corruption and informal black economies and to Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides (2001) , who show that there is a negative correlation between the cost of entry on the one hand and movements between employment and self-employment and in employment rates across countries on the other.
The paper is in the spirit of the paper by Djankov et al in using international data but it does so to answer questions on entrepreneurship, new company formation and competition for incorporations. It is therefore as far as we are aware the first attempt to supply international empirical evidence on how deregulation and the costs of regulation affect the decisions of firms on where to incorporate. The econometric tests we employ are more powerful than previous cross-sectional correlations because they establish a link between the cost of regulation and the rate of new company formation. They are also free from potential endogeneity bias.
We show that the Centros rulings were directly associated with large international flows of companies. Between 2003 and 2006 over 67,000 new private limited companies were established in the U.K. from other E.U. Member States. The yearly average number of incorporations increased from 146 firms per country-year during the pre-Centros period to 671 firms per year after Centros. These numbers contain only true Centros-type incorporations, namely firms that incorporated in the U.K.without any operational activity there. We show that our methodology successfully identifies foreign flows of incorporations and is able to remove other types of firm,, such as subsidiaries of foreign parents.
In absolute terms the largest flows of companies are from Germany, France, the Netherlands and Norway, with over 41,000 firms from Germany alone. Most of the new foreign Limited companies are small entrepreneurial firms. Migration is concentrated in private limited companies and we find no evidence that Centros has had any effect on incorporations of public limited companies in the U.K. This means that the primary impact of the change in regulation recorded in this paper is on entry of new firms rather than in the legal status of existing firms. Consistent with our predictions we show that the sharp increase in incorporations from E.U. countries in the U.K. is not mirrored by increases in incorporations from non-E.U. countries to which the ECJ rulings do not apply.
We provide evidence on the drivers of foreign incorporations. Using differences-indifferences regressions we show that post-Centros increases in legal migration rates are explained by country-specific incorporation costs and minimum capital requirements. Small differences in setup costs and capital requirements between countries have surprisingly large effects on the probability that an entrepreneur will choose to incorporate in the U.K. rather than in her home country. Legal uncertainty, language and stronger enforcement of disclosure standards do not appear to be barriers to foreign incorporations. The evidence supports a simple model of choice of legal form dictated by relative costs of incorporation in different jurisdictions rather than a broader set of non-price considerations.
Importantly, while minimum capital and incorporation costs determine the number of entrepreneurs coming from E.U. countries to the U.K., this is not true for incorporations from non-E.U. countries were the ECJ rulings do not apply. We use country-level incorporation parameters from Djankov et al (2002) and the World Bank (2005) for this analysis. Consistent with our predictions, non-Centros country incorporations are not determined by minimum capital requirements or setup costs and incorporations from high-cost but non-Centros countries do not increase over time. Strikingly, other incorporation parameters such as the duration of the incorporation process or the number of procedures to be completed do not matter for the decisions of entrepreneurs, both from the E.U. and the rest of the world.
We show that one of the reasons why price is such an important consideration is that the market has been penetrated by registration agents. These agents function as incorporation intermediaries and minimize the costs of shifting between legal jurisdictions. By doing so they reduce the significance of non-price considerations in firm choice. These agents reduce the transaction costs of uninformed entrepreneurs taking advantage of price differentials between jurisdictions. The agent effect is particularly pronounced in the German and Dutch incorporation markets and therefore seems to emerge endogenously in high-cost jurisdictions. The rest of the paper documents and estimates the Centros effects. Section 2 describes the institutional background to the analysis. Section 3 explains the empirical methodology.
Section 4 presents the main results and analyzes their robustness. Section 5 concludes.
Corporate Mobility and Regulation
We begin by describing the ECJ rulings that are relevant for this study and the differences that exist across countries n the degree of choice that companies have about location of incorporation. We discuss the factors that would be expected to influence companies' incorporation decisions and the hypotheses that we test. In addition to restrictions on the ability of firms to opt out of a particular country's company law, the regulation relating to the registration of a new company also varies between jurisdictions. In a survey of 85 countries, Djankov et. al. (2002) show that costs of regulation differ because, for example notaries are employed in the registration process in some but not all countries. Romano (1998) shows that the State of Delaware's income from the franchise tax for incorporations has amounted to between 10.9 and 24.9 percent of total tax revenue of the state between 1966 and 1996. 8 See art. 2 (1) and art. 10 lit. a of Directive 69/335/EEC. competition that, for example, states in the U.S. have (see Bar-Gill, Barzuza and Bebchuk (2004) ).
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Theory and Hypotheses Tested
The ECJ decisions provide a unique opportunity to test theories of corporate mobility and costs of regulation empirically. The ECJ has moved the E.U. from a mostly real seat model to a single market for company law operating under the incorporation model. Entrepreneurs can, for the first time, reveal their preferences by choosing among corporate law and regulation regimes.
This paper tests the theory that corporate mobility is driven by costs of regulation.
There are three types of costs of incorporation. The first is the setup costs that firms incur at the time of registration. The second is an indirect cost arising from the capital that firms have to put up at incorporation. 9 The third cost is the present value of ongoing expenses associated with operating a particular legal form over the lifetime of the firm. We can observe the first two costs directly; for the average firm in our population of newly incorporated firms, both cost types are significant relative to total firm value. The average firm is very small, with only two directors and has a life expectancy of less than three years. We therefore expect both costs to be important decision variables.
Firms should migrate from high to low cost regimes. The first hypothesis that we examine is whether deregulation has had an impact on decisions on where to incorporate.
There is a widely held view that companies, in particular small ones, are firmly wedded to their national legal systems and therefore incorporate where they operate. We test this by looking at changes in cross-border incorporation over time, and in particular before and after the deregulation associated with the Centros judgements. If there is a high degree of inertia in companies' incorporation decisions then we would expect to find little increase in crossborder incorporation.
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We then go on to refine this test by examining whether the cross-border incorporations come from within or outside the E.U. If deregulation is not a primary influence on decisions on where to incorporate then we would expect to observe little difference in cross-border incorporation from E.U. and non-E.U. countries. If on the other hand, deregulation is 9 Minimum capital requirements are not a direct cost as the paid-up capital is still owned by the shareholders. They cause indirect costs however in the form of opportunity costs or costs of increased financial constraints. 10 Note that increases in incorporations in the U.K. do not necessarily translate one for one into decreases in incorporations in the relevant home countries. This is because the Centros rulings enable a larger absolute number of entrepreneurs to incorporate. Entrepreneurs that could not previously incorporate in their domestic high minimum capital jurisdiction due to capital constraints may be able to incorporate in the U.K. following the rulings.
significant then we would expect to observe most cross-border incorporation from E.U.
countries.
We combine the above two tests in a "difference in difference" test. We examine whether the changes in cross-border incorporation around deregulation come primarily from E.U. as against non-E.U. countries. If deregulation is of little significance then we would not expect to observe such a relation, but if it is then we would.
The second hypothesis that we examine is the impact of costs of regulation on decisions of where to incorporate. We use the above categories of costs of regulation and examine their relation to cross-border incorporations. If non-price factors, such as language and the quality rather than the cost of incorporation, are more important then we would expect to observe little influence of cost. We then examine the relation between changes in crossborder incorporations and the costs of incorporation in the countries from which companies originate. If cost is important then we would expect that there would be a particularly marked movement from countries with high costs of incorporation.
Finally, the paper considers the policy response to cross-border incorporations. We examine the extent to which competition between national regimes has emerged by reporting the degree to which legislative changes have been enacted or proposed in different E.U.
countries. If policymakers are concerned about cross-border flows of companies from their countries then we would expect to observe policy reactions in those countries experiencing the largest number of exits. We would also expect to observe changes in those policy instruments that our analysis suggests have the most effect on cross-border movements. For example, if we find that minimum capital requirements are an important influence on crossborder location decisions then we would expect to observe a significant change in minimum capital requirements in those countries most affected by exits of companies. Germany if it were to engage in real activities within Germany even though it it not incorporate there.
A German Limited is incorporated in the U.K. and since it has its real activities in
Germany it must similarly register as a branch in Germany. In a Centros-type Limited the branch is the sole centre of economic activity, while the parent company-the private limited company incorporated in the U.K.-undertakes no real activity. In economic terms the branch is therefore the parent and the legal parent is a shell without real activity. Since branches are not legal entities their registration typically is not strictly enforced. Casual observation of German Limiteds incorporated in the U.K. and their branch registrations in
Germany suggests that only a fraction of companies do in fact register branches. Tentative information from various European business registers suggests that this holds for other European countries as well. The implication of this is that corporate mobility of Centros-type companies has a low probability of detection in home countries, since no information of the incorporation abroad may reach official sources in the respective home countries. In this study U.K. data therefore indirectly reveal far more extensive mobility patterns for all 25 E.U.
States than direct data from the home countries themselves would suggest.
In practice, we devise three measures of nationality. The first and the second measure define nationality through the geographic location of board control -the country of residence of the firms' directors. The first measure states that if a majority of the directors of a firmexcluding the company secretary-live in a country other than the U.K. the company is defined as coming from that country. The second measure requires all directors of a firm to live in one country other than the U.K.
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Obviously these director residence measures do not necessarily capture the centre of real activity of all firms, which is also not disclosed in U.K. Companies House filings. All firms in our sample however are new registrations and mostly small firms. For such entities the real centre of activity is close to the place of residence of the directors. As a robustness check we construct a third set of nationality measures which additionally filter out foreign Limited companies that have only "virtual" registered offices in the U.K. These are postal addresses shared by hundreds, often thousands of companies. We propose that the registered offices of firms with real activities in the U.K. would much more likely be located at the place of real activity, not at postal addresses shared with thousands of other companies. Under the directors' country of residence definitions, the virtual U.K. registered office and the 11 Incorporation agents do function as company secretaries or as directors, and in some cases as both. By using the 'all director' definition we exclude all foreign Limiteds which have at least one U.K. director. Since this U.K. director may be an agent we are excluding all foreign Limiteds using a U.K. agent who functions as a director. The 'all director' definition therefore is a lower bound of actual foreign incorporations, as it classifies some companies as domestic although they are foreign. For the bulk of the German and the Dutch Limited companies we were able to establish a link with a German and a Dutch agent, which gives us even more confidence in our methodology and results. 12 As a fourth measure we experimented with telephone books. Foreign Limited companies should have a telephone number in their home countries but not in the U.K. Given the size of our dataset, the approach however is too time-consuming. As a further alternative we tried to rely on the provisions of the 11th E.U. Company Law Directive under which a Foreign Limited has to register its real activity in its home country as a branch. A preliminary comparison between Companies House and branch registrations in Germany however reveals that only a small fraction of foreign Limiteds are registered in their home country, rendering the approach similarly impractical. 13 The company drew wide attention to the legal migration phenomenon in Germany after being featured in the weekly Der Spiegel (27 September 2004 have much larger boards of directors than the Centros companies that we are looking at and a majority of directors of these companies operating in the U.K. usually live in the U.K. Our filtering consequently identifies subsidiaries as domestic Limiteds, not as foreign Limiteds.
Third, the activities of registration agents confirm the link between the change in registration rates and the ECJ judgements. In particular, the Dutch and German foreign firms use registration agents that do not cater for U.K. firms. Foreign subsidiaries would be much more likely to use U.K. agents. Finally, and most importantly, we find that the companies we identify as foreign in the post-Centros period overwhelmingly do not have a physical presence in the U.K. We take this as strong evidence that the economic centre of activity of these companies is not the U.K. but another country. We return to these issues in our discussion of the empirical results.
Timing of the Experiment
To analyse the impact of the ECJ econometrically, the timing of the Court's decisions is crucial. Table 1 provides an overview of the relevant ECJ rulings. As shown in Figure 1 , we identify three periods relevant to our study: During the pre-Centros period (1997) (1998) (1999) 
Sample Construction and Summary Statistics
We study all new incorporations of limited liability companies in the U.K. between 1997 and 2006. We choose the U.K. because it has always applied the incorporation principle, because it has the simplest incorporation procedures and the lowest cost of incorporation in the E.U.
The U.K. also has a large number of incorporations from outside the E.U., our control group, and a central company register. Using back issues of FAME we construct a panel of all limited liability firms incorporated in the U.K. between 1997 and 2006. The procedure we use is described in detail in the Appendix and summarized here. We construct a series of cross-sections of firms that are or were registered at Companies House from nine consecutive issues of FAME. For a number of reasons the FAME disks do not contain the population of newly incorporated firms for each year. Individual FAME issues contain only data on certain years, there is an inclusion delay, some newly registered companies are never included, companies that do not file accounts start getting excluded after 22 months and for some companies data is simply missing. We close the gap by computing correction factors based on a comparison between FAME and total incorporation numbers from Companies House assuming the FAME data is missing at random.
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The range of countries reported in director home addresses is large. For practical purposes we limit the number of nationalities for our limited liability companies to 139 by working downwards though a country list sorted by GDP at current dollar prices in 2004. The remainder are pooled under the "rest of the world".
To estimate the impact of the costs of regulation on corporate mobility we also collect data on the different types of incorporation costs for all 25 E.U. information is missing we use city names or postcodes to determine the country. We apply this manual approach to all unidentified addresses in the sample. As a consequence, we are 14 Exclusion is very likely not to be random, but is also not a serious concern since we only consider companies at the time of their incorporation. However, it prevents us from performing a survival analysis.
able to determine the country of residence in 99.85 percent of all cases, leaving only 3,934 out of 2.81 million addresses unidentifiable.
Most directors reside in the U.K., followed by Germany, the US, France, the Netherlands and Norway. The median private limited company is small and has two directors and one company secretary.
Empirical Results
In this section we report the empirical results of our study. We begin by reporting Centrostype incorporations in the U.K. from other E.U. Member States between 1997 and 2006 and confirm the robustness of our company nationality definition. We then perform four sets of tests. The first compares the pre-to post-Centros difference in E.U. incorporation rates to the difference in non-E.U. incorporation rates, a differences in differences test with an untreated comparison group We expect to find a significant change in the incorporation rates in the U.K. from pre-to post-Centros for E.U. countries, but not for non-E.U. countries, to which the Centros rulings do not apply. The second set of tests relates minimum capital, setup costs and other incorporation parameters to changes in corporation rates from E.U. countries. We expect to find significant changes in incorporation rates from pre-to post-Centros only for countries, where incorporation costs and minimum capital requirements are high. The third set of results confirms that this effect only applies to Centros-countries, not to non-Centros countries and that it does not apply to other incorporation parameters. The fourth set applies a different technique of identifying the nationality of a firm based on address clusters and presents statistics about the use of registration agents, which are used as incorporation intermediaries.
The Evolution of Corporate Mobility
We begin the analysis by reporting the numbers of firms that we identify as foreign Limiteds 
Corporate Mobility Pre-and Post-Centros
In the following we analyze whether the Centros rulings have had a significant impact on incorporations. We address several questions. First, is there a significant increase in incorporations of companies from E.U. Member States to the U.K. following the Centros rulings? Second, is this increase actually caused by Centros, i.e. is the change confined to countries to which the Centros ruling applies? Third, are these results economically significant and statistically robust? We provide answers by using a differences-in-differences approach and determine the flows of foreign Limiteds to the U.K. pre-and post-Centros from around the world and contrast the E.U. with the rest of the world. We break down the sample into the three time periods described in the previous section, and compare the pre-Centros and the post-Centros cohorts of firms from around the world. We expect a regulation effect for the post-Centros period, but not for the pre-Centros period. If we use all countries in our sample as the benchmark for the E.U., the differences in time trends become even larger.
We estimate formal differences in differences as , is an estimate of the change in incorporations experienced by an E.U. country as a difference from the change for all countries around the world, i.e. the differences-in-differences estimate. The non-E.U. country group is sufficiently large to be a valid benchmark in this specification as the sample consists of roughly 40 percent non-E.U.
companies.
The analysis yields two main results. First, incorporations from E.U. countries are significantly higher than incorporations from the rest of the world. Second, and more importantly, incorporations from E.U. countries increase significantly more post-Centros than incorporations from the rest of the world. The difference is significant in all cases. The second result clearly confirms that E.U. Member States incorporate significantly larger numbers of Limiteds in the U.K. following the ECJ rulings, while a similar effect cannot be detected for countries to which the Centros rulings do not apply.
The Determinants of Corporate Mobility
What drives corporate mobility in the E.U.? In this section we begin by providing an overview of what should not determine mobility, namely all parameters of a Centros-type Limited which do not change upon incorporation in the U.K. We then identify the motives that seem to be driving entrepreneurs from the E.U. to incorporate Centros-type Limiteds in the U.K.
To begin with, corporate mobility of the Centros type generally has no tax
consequences. An E.U. Limited becomes liable to tax in the U.K. with its worldwide income upon incorporation. Double taxation agreements between the U.K. and all E.U. countries however rule that if the permanent establishment of the firm is in its home country and it generally has no economic contact with the U.K., the firm is taxed in its home country only.
The firm has to file a zero tax return in the U.K. or to apply for exemption from filing for having a non-resident status. On the other hand, it is plausible and confirmed by anecdotal evidence that foreign Limiteds may be incorporated in the U.K. for purposes of fraud and tax evasion. Also, country-specific regulation of firms cannot be easily circumvented by using a foreign Limited. For example, codetermination rules in Germany cannot be circumvented by U.K. incorporation, as the rules apply to all companies with a permanent establishment in Germany, independently of how or where the company is incorporated.
We show that what does matter for corporate mobility are the large differences regarding minimum capital requirements and setup costs. We test the hypothesis that corporate mobility is driven by these variables.
The differences in minimum capital requirements and typical setup costs are considerable between E.U. Member States. where 451 Euro are required to achieve legal status of limited liability. In summary, crosscountry differences in incorporation costs are large even within the E.U. This confirms previous evidence by Djankov et al (2002) .
For public limited companies a different ranking emerges. High minimum capital requirements exist for companies in Finland, Hungary, Italy, Poland and the U.K., low minimum capital requirements exist in Cyprus, Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Slovenia.
The U.K. therefore is a relatively unattractive country for incorporating a public limited company. Our result of essentially no foreign public limited company incorporations in the U.K. confirm this.
To assess the importance of these incorporation variables on the mobility of firms we re-run the regressions from Table 4 . We now however decompose the Centros effect into two components. The first component is the difference in differences due to the Centros rulings which applies to all E.U. countries. The second component is the difference between highand low-cost countries. We test whether the post-Centros increase of foreign Limiteds that we detect among E.U. countries is conditional on whether the originating country is a low-cost or high-cost jurisdiction. If the ECJ rulings have induced a shift in new incorporations towards low incorporation cost countries, we would expect the post-Centros increase to be higher for high-cost countries than for low-cost countries. Our previous sets of tests already have established that incorporation rates from E.U. countries increase following Centros while they do not for other countries. In this step we now verify whether the magnitude of the Centros effect is attributable to incorporation costs and minimum capital requirements.
We consider four variables: minimum capital, minimum paid-up capital, incorporation costs and minimum capital plus incorporation costs. We estimate the following specification: The dependent variable is the number of companies from the E.U. Member States incorporated in the U.K. HIGH is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the respective variable is above the E.U. median. The regressions also include the interaction of Centros and HIGH.
The results are reported in Table 6 .
If corporate mobility is indeed driven by cost of incorporation considerations, we would expect large numbers of exits of firms from those countries where local regulations require high minimum and paid-up capital. The interaction term (Centros) x (HIGH) should therefore be positive and significantly different from zero. The results show that, consistent with our prediction, the coefficient for the (Centros) x (HIGH) interaction term is significantly positive. The results hold for both the "majority of directors" and the "all directors" criteria.
Incorporations from other E.U. countries in the U.K. therefore increase more for firms that come from countries with high minimum capital requirements and high incorporation costs.
To confirm that the results are not spurious we run high versus low cost differences in differences regressions also for worldwide incorporations in Table 7 . In the regression we use four incorporation parameters from World Bank (2005) 
Regulatory Responses
We find evidence of regulatory competition. Germany and the Netherlands, the two countries with the largest numbers of firm exits, are responding to the U.K. In the calendar year 2005 the rate was 36.6%. Interestingly only 4.9% of these SARL were set up with a minimum capital of €1; the vast majority was set up with a capital of €501-1000 (25.7%), €1001-3000 (27.4%) or €3001-7500 (28.8%). 19 Notwithstanding the fact that member states do not levy franchise fees on incorporations, they are responding to corporate mobility by lowering the costs of incorporation. Domestic incorporation is per se perceived to be important even if it does not bear directly on government revenues or the location of production or control.
Robustness
We perform several robustness checks to make sure our results are not spurious. First, we drop all firm observations from Germany to make sure that our results are not driven by the large number of incorporations from this country. We re-run the regressions from Tables 4, 6 and 7 and find that even after excluding all German observations, the results are quantitatively unchanged.
Second, we take into account that absolute numbers of foreign incorporations from any one country will be related to the size of the economy and some relationship may exist between size of the economy and incorporation parameters. We scale absolute firm numbers in Tables 4, 6 and 7 by GDP and population figures, similar to columns [3] and [4] in Table 4 .
We do this both for the majority of directors and the all directors measures. Our results are unchanged by this scaling.
Third, it may be that other incorporation parameters matter for the decision of entrepreneurs of why they incorporate in the U.K. We re-run the regressions from Table 7 using other components of the World Bank (2005) index. However we do not find any other incorporation parameters that explain the postCentros increase in incorporations from E.U. countries. While it is plausible that other considerations matter as well for individual entrepreneurs, empirically the only variables that explain post-Centros corporate mobility are country-specific incorporation costs and minimum capital requirements.
Fourth, we consider the possibility that our definition of the nationality of a firm may not capture the true nationality of firms. We previously defined a foreign Limited as a company that has its directors and owners residing in a country other than the U.K., its main centre of activity in that country but is incorporated in the U.K. as a private limited company.
One possible objection to this approach is that we are placing considerable weight on the physical location of directors. It could be that our methodology is picking up significant numbers of firms where the directors do not live in the U.K. but the firm still has its main centre of activity in the U.K. These would most likely be subsidiaries of foreign firms which are not the Centros-type companies we are interested in. We resolve this by showing in the following that the vast majority of foreign firms incorporated in the U.K. following the Centros rulings in fact do not have a physical presence in the U.K.
We verify whether the companies we identify as foreign Limiteds in fact have a physical presence in the U.K. as follows. Our approach is a purely mechanical one of identifying clusters of firms using the same address. Independently of how conservatively we define address clusters, the analysis yields the result that the foreign Limiteds we previously identify as coming from E.U. Member States indeed are Centros-type firms and overwhelmingly lack a physical presence in the U.K.
We analyze all sample firms by their primary address. We find that firm addresses are not unique, but instead often are used by hundreds, if not thousands of other firms as well.
While it is of course possible that two firms in our sample have exactly the same address-for example, if a firm died and another firm moved into the offices later or if the address signifies a business park or large commercial estate-it is very unlikely that if more than a dozen or even hundreds of firms have the identical primary address, that these addresses correspond to businesses with real economic activity. Our initial and very conservative definition therefore is that a firm lacks a physical presence if its primary address is an address used by at least 100 firms with different registration numbers. We reduce the necessary cluster size to 50 and 20 firms at the same address consequently. We then condition identifying an E.U. Limited not just on the directors' place of residence but additionally on being incorporated at an address cluster.
The results reported in Panel A of Table 8 show yearly percentages of foreign private limited liability companies that are located at address clusters. In the table the "all directors" criterion is used to identify the nationalities of companies. Results are virtually identical for the "majority of directors" criterion and not reported. To illustrate reading the table, in 1997 17.4 percent of all Austrian companies incorporating in the U.K. were incorporated at an address used by at least 100 firms, in 2006 the percentage was 88.8 percent.
The results from Panel A show a very consistent pattern. It is that pre-Centros the majority of E.U. companies incorporated in the U.K. do have a physical presence in the U.K.
Post-Centros however, there is strong evidence of the reverse, i.e. only a minority of E.U. We proceed as follows. Using the address cluster information from the preceding are used by the leading German incorporation agent, Go Ahead Limited. Almost every agent uses several addresses. We use web searches to identify which address belongs to which agent and from which country the agents are operating. Table 3 using the location of directors as the criterion. This strongly confirms the robustness of our approach of identifying Centros-type companies in Table 3 .
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the effects of deregulation on corporate mobility within Europe. Using data on over 2 million newly incorporated U.K. companies it provides evidence of a significant inflow of private limited companies from all E.U. Member States into the U.K. States directly influence the flow of companies from that country to the U.K. In particular, using a cross-sectional model we find that much of the variation in the change between pre-20 The largest address cluster in our sample is "Gabem Group, Waterside, Petworth, West Sussex, GU28 9BP". This address belongs to the company Gabem Group which is not an incorporation agent and has registered 46,847 firms at this address. We exclude Gabem Group from the sample in the clustering analysis as it distorts the true concentration measure of U.K. firms. 21 This is confirmed by the agents' web-sites. While all of the agents from outside the U.K. explicitly refer to the ECJ rulings on their websites, none of the domestic U.K. agents do.
and post-Centros flows of firms from Member States to the U.K. is explained by direct and indirect costs of national incorporation procedures. The stronger enforcement and disclosure standards in the U.K. as well as potential legal uncertainty and language barriers seem to be unimportant in comparison for the large numbers of firms utilizing the freedom of incorporation within Europe provided by the ECJ rulings. Corporate mobility is mostly confined to the smallest companies. Paradoxically, it is therefore companies with a largely domestic outlook in their real activities that choose to be internationally mobile.
Our findings are consistent with micro-evidence from the entrepreneurship literature suggesting that financing constraints are a major impediment to small business formation. In support of this hypothesis we find that for example relatively small differences in minimum capital requirements make a large difference in the rate of new company formation. The transaction costs associated with foreign incorporations are substantially reduced by intermediary agencies and indirect costs of incorporation such as the number of procedures to be completed and the time to obtain legal status similarly drive the decision to incorporate abroad.
Countries are responding to the migration of new incorporations to the U.K. by lowering or abolishing minimum capital requirements and the cost of setting up a domestic limited liability company more generally. This race to match U.K. standards seems to have characteristics of the regulatory competition that the U.S. corporate mobility literature has been emphasising, although the phenomena that this paper documents are very different from corporate mobility and the competition for corporate charters within the US. First, the corporate mobility that we observe relates to new company formation, not to established companies and, second, entrepreneurs are not seeking to take advantage of specific features of U.K. company law, as seems to be the case when companies migrate to Delaware from other U.S. states. Instead, the formation agents used by Centros-type companies offer boiler plate contracts and migration is driven by differences in the regulation of new company formation rather than by specific differences in company law. Inspire Art Ltd. is incorporated in the U.K., but operates in the Netherlands. The Dutch Government upholds that while the company can legally operate in the Netherlands, it must adhere to legislation in place for formally foreign companies, which among other requires that directors are personally liable if the firm has minimum capital below the minimum capital requirement for Dutch firms. The database construction is performed in six steps. First, as shown in Table A1 , from each FAME disk we export the identification number of firms with limited liability that were newly incorporated in the U.K. between 1 January 1997 and 31 December 2006. From these records we identify the FAME disks with the largest coverage for a particular year. Second, from these disks we extract all relevant data, including company name, registered address, the name and home address of each director, the name and home address of each company secretary, the incorporation date and the current status of the company (alive, dormant or dead). Third, we exclude companies with partial director records. 22 Fourth, we drop directors who were not appointed in the year of incorporation.
This step is necessary because FAME contains complete director histories. We keep only the snapshot of directors at the time of incorporation. This step also excludes nominee directors with appointment dates earlier than the year of incorporation, for example from "shelf registrations".
Fifth, we determine the nationality of the new firms using the director home address methodology described earlier in this section.
Applying the nationality definitions increases as well as decreases the number of useable are dispersed-or because director nationality cannot be identified from address data.
In the final step we scale the raw data to correct for data attrition in FAME. To do this we use the total number of private limited companies derived via Steps 1 to 5 and subtract observations due to double nationality counting and add companies without nationality or unidentified country.
This yields the total number of real firms for which data are available. We then divide the total number of incorporations of private limited companies reported in the annual reports of Companies
House by the number of real firm observations. This yields a correction factor, which we consequently multiply with the number of observations for all countries and for all years.
22 As discussed before we use director data to identify the nationality of a company. We exclude companies with missing address data for one or more directors. This ensures that a company is not wrongly classified as having a majority or all directors from one particular country since the missing entry or entries could be a different country. We also exclude companies that do not report having a company secretary. This ensures that we do not classify foreign companies as domestic. Since Limiteds by law must have at least one company secretary and company secretaries for foreign Limiteds tend to be based in the U.K., not excluding companies that do not report a company secretary could therefore bias the nationality identification based on a mix of director and company secretary address data, since at least one of the directors is in fact most likely a company secretary. 
